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Keynes, John Maynard, as an Interpreter of the Classical 
Economists 
J.M. Keynes characterized the classical school of economics as those ,/01-
low,ers of Ricardo' who 'perfected the theory of Ricardian economics' 
and ·included J.S. Mill, Marshall, Edgeworth and Pigou as its principal 
representatives. Keynes believed that he was extending Marx's characteri-
zation of the classical school as including Ricardo, James Mill and their 
predecessors whose work had culminated in Ricardian economics. He 
was aware that he was 'perhaps perpetuating a solecism' in his extension 
of the term, but thought it still appropriate, because in his view the 'clas-
sical theory of the subject' dominated the economic thinking 'of the 
governing and academic classes of this generation, as it has for a hundred 
years past' (Keynes, CW, 1. 3). Given our current understanding of the 
differences between classical and neoclassical economics (e.g., Garegnani, 
197811979), it is probably correct to say that Keynes did indeed misuse 
the term. Certainly he was less concerned with what have come to be 
regarded as the characteristic doctrines of classical political economy 
than with neoclassical views of his own time. 
Keynes's purpose in treating Mill, Marshall, Edgeworth and Pigou as 
classical economists and proponents of Ricardian economics was to set 
off their work together with most of past economics (Mal thus was an 
important exception) as a special case to be contrasted with his own gen-
eral theory of the economy. Ricardo, he allowed, correctly assessed his 
own theory as excluding any consideration of the nature and causes of 
wealth, and repudiated 'any interest in the amount of the national divi-
dend, as distinct from its distribution'. Classical or Ricardian economics 
was thus the ' theory of Value and Production ... concerned with the dis-
tribution of a given volume of employed resources between different uses 
and with the conditions which', assuming the employment of a quantity 
of resources, determine their relative rewards and the relative values of 
their products' . In contrast, Keynes's own general theory explained 'what 
determines the actual employment of the available resources' (CW, I, 4). 
He thus saw classical theory not as flawed , but rather as limited in its 
application to the actual world, because its requirements were rarely satis-
fied . Indeed, were 'our central controls [to] succeed in establishing an 
aggregate volume of output corresponding to full employment as nearly 
as is practicable, the classical theory comes into its own again from this 
point onwards' (ibid.: 378). In his view, then, the forces determining the 
volume of output were outside the ambit of classical thinking. 
Keynes was aware that classical economists had described and infor-
mally investigated fluctuations in employment and output, but saw 
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himself as contributing to the pure theory of the subject. To this end, he 
first set out what he believed to be the two fundamental postulates upon 
which the classical theory of employment implicitly relied: first, that the 
wage is equal to the marginal product of labour (the demand schedule for 
employment) and, second, that the utility of the real wage is equal to the 
marginal disutility of the employment involved (the supply schedule for 
employment) . Putting aside imperfect competition, he believed the first 
postulate was typically fulfilled, but that the second generally did not 
obtain. Moreover, while the second postulate was compatible with there 
being frictional and voluntary unemployment, it did not allow for a third 
form of unemployment central to his own argument, namely, involuntary 
unemployment. Here he took Pigou's Theory of Unemployment, pub-
lished in 1933, as the best account of the classical theory of employment. 
Pigou had recognized that there was unemployed labour at existing 
money wages, but had argued that money wages coUld not fall to increase 
employment because of open or tacit agreement between workers not to 
accept lower money wages. Such unemployment was thus really voluntary 
in his view. But Keynes argued that, even were it true that labour was 
unwilling to work for lower money wages (contrary to what he observed 
had happened in the United States in 1932), this did not imply that the 
existing level of real wages accurately measured the marginal disutility of 
labour, since experience showed that a rise in the price of wage goods 
could reduce the value of the money wage without leading to a withdrawal 
of labour. Moreover, experience also showed that wide fluctuations in the 
volume of employment had occurred without much variation in real 
wages. It was consequently more reasonable to suppose that labour sought 
a minimum money wage, not a minimum real wage, and from this it fol-
lowed that the 'classical school' was mistaken in assuming that the supply 
of labour is solely a function . of the real wage, and that the real wage 
accurately measures the marginal disutility of labour. 
But Keynes thought there was an even more fundamental objection to 
the second postulate in its requirement that bargaining between entrepre-
neurs and labour determine the real wage, and so enable labour to bring 
the real wage into line with the marginal disutility of labour by accepting 
or rejecting money wage offers from entrepreneurs: 'There may exist no 
expedient by which labour as a whole can reduce its real wage to a given 
figure by making revised money bargains with entrepreneurs.' Thus the 
real wage could exceed the marginal disutility of employment, and labour 
could be involuntarily unemployed: ' In assuming that the wage bargain 
determines the real wage the classical school have slipt in an illicit 
assumption. ' This, Keynes asserted, was one of his 'main themes' and one 
he intended to address at length in The General Theory by providing an 
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alternative account of the forces determining the real wage, specifically, in 
his explanation of the income determination process (CW, I. 13). 
At the same time, Keynes emphasized that it was important to retain the 
first postulate of classical theory, once having given up the second, in order 
to understand properly what changes in employment involved. By the first 
postulate, the real wage is inversely related to the volume of employment. 
But, giving up the second postulate, it follows that 'a decline in employ-
ment, although necessarily associated with labour's receiving a wage equal 
in value to a larger quantity of wage-goods, is not necessarily due to 
labour's demanding a larger quantity of wage-goods; and a willingness on 
the part of labour to accept lower money-wages is not necessarily a remedy 
for unemployment' (ibid. : 18). This was due to labour's being unable to 
determine the level of real wages in bargaining with entrepreneurs. 
Keynes believed that underlying the whole of classical theory was a 
single proposition, originating in the work of Ricardo and Say, that supply 
creates its own demand, or 'that the whole of the costs of production must 
necessarily be spent in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, on purchasing 
the product' (ibid.: 18). An important corollary of the doctrine, especially 
as advanced by the early Marshall, was ' that any individual act of abstain-
ing from consumption necessarily leads to, and amounts to the same thing 
as, causing the labour and commodities thus released from supplying con-
sumption to be invested in the production of capital wealth' (ibid.: 19). 
Applying these principles to modern economies, Keynes asserted, involved 
using a false analogy to a non-exchange Robinson Crusoe type of econ-
omy. The error was often made in connection with the original 
proposition of Say and Ricardo, because economists too often failed to 
distinguish a similar, 'indubitable' proposition, namely, ' that the income 
derived in the aggregate by all the elements in the community concerned in 
a productive activity has a value exactly equal to the value of the output' 
(ibid.: 20). The error was typically made in connection with Marshall's 
corollary, because ' it is indubitable' that the sum of the net increments of 
the wealth of individuals must be exactly equal to the aggregate net incre-
ment of the wealth of the community' (ibid.: 21). 
Keynes thought it important to dispel these classical doctrines if the 
operation of the economy was to be correctly understood. Marshall 's 
saving- investment proposition made ' two essentially different activities 
appear to be the same', though in fact ' the motives which determine the 
latter are not linked in any simple way with the motives which determine 
the former '. From this view, moreover, flowed a number of misleading 
views regarding ' the social advantages of private and national thrift, the 
traditional attitude towards the rate of interest, the classical theory of 
unemployment, the quantity theory of money, the unqualified advan-
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tages of laissez-Jaire in respect of foreign trade and much else which we 
shall have to question' (ibid.). 
Not all of the classical economists, of course, came in for criticism from 
Keynes. Keynes credited Malthus with being 'concerned with what deter-
mines the volume of output', where Ricardo had only investigated its 
distribution (CW, X. 97) . He lamented Malthus's lack of influence on 
19th-century economics, and praised Malthus for having argued that inad-
equate effective demand for output could cause a fall in profits. Keynes 
noted that Malthus also anticipated the paradox of thrift, and grasped 
that public works (and expenditure by landlords and the wealthy) could be 
a remedy to the problem of imbalance between saving and investment. 
However, Malthus's 'defect lay in his overlooking entirely the part played 
by the rate of interest' (ibid.: 102). This left the real and monetary sides of 
the economy separate it la Say, and effectively allmyed Marshall to take 
over Ricardo's view that savings were automatically invested. 
Keynes thus essentially identified classical economics with Say's Law, 
and believed Ricardo principally at fault for economists' subsequent mis-
conceptions. In this he was probably overgenerous to Marshall, and 
insufficiently generous to Ricardo. Indeed Keynes's friend and colleague at 
Cambridge, Piero Sraffa, demonstrated after the appearance of The 
General Theory that Keynes was not correct in saying that at full employ-
ment the classical theory once again comes into its own, since by this 
Keynes had meant Marshall's price theory with its unsuccessful treatment 
of capital. Keynes, however, devoted little time to long period issues, and 
thus never truly grappled with the c1assicals' paradigmatic concerns with 
growth, distribution and accumulation. His critique of classical economics 
should thus be seen as principally restricted to the rejection of Say's Law. 
JOHN B. DAVIS 
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